


# Rethinking EU carbon market policies

## Safeguarding against price volatility and carbon leakage

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



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## The EU carbon market



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


# My propositions

- The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) is an unprecedented and unique policy activity.
- It has the potential for shaping energy and climate policy.
- It has also the potential for re-designing economic development on a global scale.

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## Understanding the carbon market

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


# The carbon market

## The simplistic view

- **Based on courageous assumptions**

- Perfectly informed forward looking agents
- Market knows until 2020 the aggregated marginal abatement costs for all installations



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# The carbon market and a bit more reality

## The cap may not be binding

- **Abundant historical examples**


- UK ETS
- EU ETS Phase 1
- EU ETS Phase 2 – emerging evidence

- **Theory and evidence combine on why allocations tend to be inflated**

- **Not certain that even Phase 3 will be binding, particularly when banking taken into account**

- **Michael Grubb**

- Carbon Prices in Phase 3 of the EU ETS Climate Strategies



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
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# The carbon market and a bit more reality

## Perceived abatement costs may vary

- There is high uncertainty about abatement costs
- Abatement costs vary
  - Interest rates
  - Capital depreciation rates
  - Energy prices
  - Cyclical fluctuation
- Abatement costs may not be unique at all
  - e.g. joint production structures



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
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# The carbon market and a bit more reality

## Perceived supply of allowances may vary

- The impact of strategic buyers and sellers




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# The carbon market and a bit more reality

- Aggregate information about installations may be wrong
- Particular problem of free allowances



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


## Rethinking the design of the carbon market

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# The current controversies about EU ETS market

- **The Commission position:  
Regulatory framework reduces price volatility**
  - Market data now available for several years
  - Banking from Phase 2 to Phase 3
  - Predictable cap until 2020
- **But:  
Increasing evidence of a  
non incentive-compatible market**
  - Strategic actors push down market price
  - Uncertainty creates additional costs



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## What incentives do we expect from the carbon market?

- **Incentives for cost minimisation**
  - Current carbon management activities
  - Investment decisions
- **Assurance about a carbon price range creates stronger incentives for technological change**
- **Almost all emerging carbon markets include some kind of mechanism to stabilise the carbon price**
  - e.g. RGGI (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative)

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# Steps to a carbon market management

## A coordinated procedure for auctioning

- Emerging consensus that carbon prices should be predictable
- Design of auctioning offers instruments for reducing price volatility
- Step 1:  
Reserve price for auctioning defines floor price
- Step 2:  
Timing of supply of allowances for auctioning
  - Timing and volume of auctioning,
  - No need for auctioning by individual Member States
- Step 3:  
Determining a ceiling price
  - Carbon authority intervenes in market

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### Making the decisions about ETS in phase 3 operational

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# Dealing with carbon leakage

## Major problems with data requirements

- **Problems with publicly available data**

- Incomplete
- Limited reliability
- Limited comparability among Member States

- **Disaggregated data needed**

- Gross value added
- Direct carbon emissions
- Electricity input

- **Assumptions needed**

- Carbon price
- Impact of carbon price on electricity price

Relative carbon cost impact  
CITL      UNFCCC  
%            %

	CITL %	UNFCCC %
Austria	12%	13%
Belgium	8%	10%
Bulgaria	91%	94%
Czech Republic	10%	23%
Denmark		
Estonia		
Finland	9%	9%
France	17%	13%
Germany	7%	14%
Greece	4%	4%
Hungary	15%	28%
Ireland		
Italy	8%	6%
Latvia		
Lithuania		
Luxembourg		
Netherlands		
Poland	11%	22%
Portugal	5%	5%
Romania	58%	37%
Slovakia		
Slovenia	3%	4%
Spain	6%	8%
Sweden	5%	4%
United Kingdom	29%	31%

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# Dealing with carbon leakage

## A cooperative procedure for CL and benchmarking (1)

- **Without the cooperation of sectors / sub-sectors it is hardly possible to determine reliable carbon cost indicators**

- **Sectors / sub-sectors which see a risk of CL are invited to opt-in for Carbon Market Monitoring**

- The opt-in procedure eliminates the need for deciding on NACE 3 or 4 categories

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# Dealing with carbon leakage

## A cooperative procedure for CL and benchmarking (2)

- The CM Monitoring is done annually and determines
  - The actual carbon cost and trade intensity indicators
  - The updated list of sectors / subsectors exposed to CL
- The information provided for CM Monitoring also serves for the distribution of free allowances to installations by a benchmarking procedure

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


# Thank you.

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## Rethinking the procedure for carbon leakage

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## Carbon Leakage Impact on production

### Trade intensity


- ↗ Relocation of production from existing installations

### Export Competition

- ↗ Exports to Non-ETS Countries

### Import Competition

- ↗ Imports from Non-ETS Countries to ETS Countries



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
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# Carbon Leakage

## Impact on investments

- **C-Cost intensity**
  - **Relocation of new installations**
- **Relocation competition for new installations**
  - **C-Costs in gross value added**



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
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# Carbon Leakage

## Some indicators

- **Sectors and individual product classes are exposed to carbon leakage for different reasons and to different degrees**



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